47. Intelligence Sources – 5. S&T

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception – SIGINT


4. Imagery


5. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


6. Measurement and Sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




7. Other

Scientific and Technical (S& T) Intelligence. This is the product resulting from collecting, evaluating, analyzing, and interpreting foreign scientific and technical information. It covers foreign developments in basic and applied research and in applied engineering techniques; and scientific and technical characteristics, capabilities, and limitations of all foreign military systems, weapons, weapon systems, and materiel, the research and development related thereto, and the production methods employed for their manufacture. Ths wais my own analysis assignment, and something I have continued the rest of my life. My own particular specialty is nuclear weapons, missile defense, and disaster response.
Advantages

1. The most accurate intelligence available on capabilities and characteristics of foreign weapon systems


2. May be used to determine systems capabilities


3. Engineers, scientists, and technical experts intimately familiar with the subject being investigated

Limitations

1. May be extremely limited or inaccurate on new systems or systems to which there has been no hands- on access


2. Prolonged analysis may be required


3. Capabilities do not necessarily indicate intentions

See an excellent article by CIA Intelligence Officer, Robert M. Clark Scientific And Technical Intelligence Analysis.
The next entry will be on Measurement and Sensing.

46. Intelligence Sources – 4. Imagery

Today's entry presents Imagery as a source of intelligence.

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception – SIGINT


4. Imagery


5. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


6. Measurement and Sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




7. Other

Imaging Intelligence(IMINT),is the representation of objects reproduced optically or electronically on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Imagery comes from visual photography, usually from aerial observation. radar sensors such as sidelooking airborne radar (SLAR), infrared sensors, lasers, and electro- optics. While each sensor operates at different spectrum frequencies and each type of imagery has distinctive characteristics, the advantages and limitations of each are similar. Observation may be made from anything from blimps to satellites. The US has used high-flying, virtually undetectable aircraft, such as the SR70 Blackbird, or the infamous U-2.Countries capable of launching satellites today all have agreed to declare the orbits to the U.N.

My work in intelligence often involved photo-imaging. Fortunately there were a number of expert photointerpreters to help clarify what was in the photography. When it came to crucial sites, it might be just one person in the entire U.S. intelligence community who had the expertise to interpret imaging from that site.

Advantages

1. A variety of platforms and media is available


2. Capable of pinpoint target positioning


3. Activity can be detected


4. Order of battle can be counted


5. Target characteristics (physical or environmental) can be studied in detail


6. Large area collection possible


7. Excellent resolution possible


8. Highly credible because it can be seen by the user

Limitations:

1. Except for radar, imagery quality normally degraded by darkness, adverse weather.


2. Subject to deception or concealment techniques


3. Requires extensive support facilities (such as photointerpretation centers)


4. Can be expensive


5. Subject to misinterpretation or misidentification


6. Situation represented on the image may exist only for the instant it was captured

The next entry will be on Science and Technology Intelligence.

45. Intelligence Sources – 3. SIGINT

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception – SIGINT


4. Imagery


5. Measurement and Sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


7. Other




1. Diplomatic reports


2. Liaison relationships


3. Interrogation

Signals Intelligence. Known as SIGINT, this is information gathered from interception of signals. SIGINT is a category of intelligence comprising, either individually or in combination, all communications intelligence. It is derived from foreign communications and electronics signals in two principal categories, COMINT; and ELINT. It also includes foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (TELINT) and FISINT. The general categories of SIGINT are:

1. COMINT— Communications Intelligence derived from the intercept of foreign communications. COMINT usually requires decryption and decoding. Enigma machines (Ultra, etc.) are examples of methods of denying communication information from other countries by encryption. During WW II codebreakers radically changed the war by breaking very difficult codes. The Germans used several methods, including Geheimschreiber (secret writer) – the traffic was known a Fish. For some of these machines, the Allies could read the messages almost in real time. Japan had "System 97 Printing Machine for European Characters" or Angōki Taipu-B, codenamed Purple by the Allies. The decrypted traffic was known as Magic. Decryption of Soviet traffic (after WWII) led to the Venona project and identification of several Soviet as well as British and American agents. In current times, the cell phone is an excellent device for counterintelligence. All terrorists carry cell phones. They are trackable, and provide many bits of information, even DNA if they are found abandoned.
   
2. ELINT—Electronic Intelligence derived from the analysis of foreign noncommunications and electromagnetic radiation emitted from other than nuclear detonations or radio-active sources.
   
3. TELINT—Telemetry Intelligence: the collection and analysis of telemetry data from the target’s missile or sometimes from aircraft tests.
   
4. FISINT—Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence
   

NSA is responsible for the US SIGINT program. Each military service has a service cryptological agency, operationally directed by NSA through the Central Security Service (CSS), to ensure missions are properly assigned and duplication of effort is avoided. In the Air Force, this mission is assigned to Air Intelligence Agency (AIA). The Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) and the Naval Security Group (NSG) make up the remaining agencies of the military NSA and CSS structure. The Director of NSA also serves as Chief of CSS.

SIGINT has many uses, but its application requires a thorough knowledge of the product. Order of battle depends heavily on correlation and analysis of COMINT and ELINT. Mission route planning requires current intelligence on enemy defensive positions and capabilities. Targets can be detected and located through airborne direction finding techniques. Intelligence concerning enemy operational plans may be obtained through signal analysis or cryptologic procedures. Confirmation of other types of intelligence can be made by targeting personnel with the aid of SIGINT reports. Finally, post strike or attack data and damage resulting from missions may also be obtained.

1. Advantages of SIGINT




1. Potential for almost instantaneous information


2. Can sometimes reveal specific information on enemy units


3. Levels of activity and significant changes in these levels can often be determined


4. Organizational structure and order of battle may be obtained


5. Can cue other systems


6. Equipment capability can be learned


7. Emitter location can be approximated or pinpointed (dependent on accuracy capability of the system)


8. Site function can be determined




2. Limitations of SIGINT




1. Data may be denied by use of secure communications


2. False information may be passed by the enemy for deception purposes


3. Collection subject to atmospheric conditions


4. Locations derived from SIGINT may be imprecise


5. Specially configured collection platforms required


6. Use of SIGINT collection platforms requires extensive coordination between collectors and users

The next entry will be on Imagery.

44. Intelligence Sources – 2. HUMINT

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception


4. Measurement and sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




5. Imagery


6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


7. Other




1. Diplomatic reports


2. Liaison relationships


3. Interrogation

2. HUMINT

As one would expect, HUMINT stands for human sources – gathered from a person on the ground. It is difficult to acquire (as in present-day Iran), and hard to manage. Further it is extremely difficult to verify validity and reliability of a human source.
HUMINT includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of informants and spies. HUMINT may provide such information as insights into adversary plans and intentions for target development, adversary deliberations and decisions for developing our own objectives, research and development goals and strategies, blueprints for weaponeering, etc. Some intelligence requirements can best be satisfied by human source exploitation.

1. Overt activities are performed openly without concealment. While some aspects may be classified, the overall activity is generally easily detected, or the sources are exploited in an open but discrete manner. Some overt HUMINT activities are:
   
   
   
   1. Conventional programs for interrogating, émigrés, refugees, escapees, prisoners of war, and detainees.
   
   
   2. After-action debriefing of military operations, and legal travelers.
   
   
   3. Programs to exploit open publications.
   
   
   4. Diplomatic reports. Such reports give indications of a country’s intentions and plans
      
      
      
      • Some are in the open,
        
      • Friendly accredited diplomats
        
      • Military attachés and Liaison relationships. Attaches are posted by a country to their embassies abroad. They are “legal” spies, and can be helpful not only to their home country but to the country in which they are posted since they provide a direct way of revealing information they want others to know about. Usually they are declared to the host country. It is a myth that liaison operates against the host country. There is the so-called "third-party rule" – whereby the recipient of intelligence from an ally should not share it on with anyone without the originator's consent. MI5 (in the UK) and the US insisted that this is an immutable law of international security. What a U.S. attaché learns in Germany is not shared with any other country other than the US and possibly Germany.
      
      
      • Other diplomatic reports obtained by other methods.
      
      
      
      
   5. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
      
   6. Patrolling (military police, patrols, etc.)
      
   
   
2. Sensitive activities fall between overt and clandestine. Because their disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States, they require special protection from disclosure, as well as concealment of the sponsor’s identity.


3. Clandestine activities must be conducted so that both the existence of the operation itself and the identity of the sponsor are secret. They may include rendition.




1. Espionage by agents
   
2. Interrogators of POWs or captured agents use a variety of methods to get information. Most simply try to provoke conversations, and may not even use direct questioning. Steps up may include psychological pressure, bugging of cells, sleep deprivation, noise, sounds of torture, and false executions. NATO makes much of the illegal “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.


3. Strategic reconnaissance, as by Special Forces

Advantages of HUMINT

1. Can be used to reveal enemy plans and intentions and uncover scientific or weapon developments before they are used or detected by other technical collection systems


2. Can provide documentary evidence of enemy activities


3. Relatively cost effective


4. May provide coverage in areas beyond the capabilities of other sources, such as detailed descriptions of underground facilities or those located below jungle canopy, as well as internal facility arrangements


5. Can reveal construction characteristics for vulnerability estimates


6. Can determine production capabilities and impact of facilities on enemy military and industrial needs


7. Yields information on the sources of raw materials, equipment, and necessary transportation for systems analysis


8. May reveal direct and indirect relationships between facilities


9. Can give near real- time target intelligence via radio transmission


10. Can cover targets against which sensor programs are restricted by political restraints


11. Targeter can use it to refine or revise intelligence estimates based on other sources of information; helps the analyst learn identification and functions previously unidentified, as well as give direct and indirect effects of airstrikes during hostilities

Limitations of HUMINT

1. Time lag between collection, reporting, and verifying some information can be too long and render it useless


2. Collection success cannot be predicted with certainty


3. May be politically sensitive


4. Dissemination and fusion of information into targeting channels is often inadequate and difficult to accomplish


5. Determining reliability of the source and verifying the information is often very difficult

The next entry will be on SIGINT

43. What Are the Sources of Intelligence – 1. Open

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception


4. Measurement and sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




5. Imagery


6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


7. Other




1. Diplomatic reports


2. Liaison relationships


3. Interrogation

Recall the process of Intelligence Analysis (Entry Number 41)



This graphic shows that the process is cyclical, and really never ends.

1. Open Sources

About 85% of information is obtained from open sources, such as newspapers, journals, etc. As an example, in 1938 nuclear fission was observed and published in scientific journals. As soon as the journals reached the United States the science of fission was immediately known and understood. When it was realized that fission might be weaponized, all publication on fission ceased. That gave every nuclear physicist in the world the indication that the United States might have a nuclear weapon development program underway. Some of the types of open source material are:

• Internet


• General: such as newspapers, magazines, books, foreign broadcasts, telephone directories, films, maps, and charts


• Scientific/Technical literature (also applies to Scientific and Technical Intelligence)


• Various HUMINT specialties (e.g. trade shows, association meetings, interviews) (Overlaps with HUMINT, or Human Intelligence)

1. Advantages:




• Often presents an “insider’s” view.


• Frequently provides a source of pictures and information not obtained from any other source


• Gives insight into another’s thought processes and intentions


• May be the most timely information available


• Timeliness




2. Limitations:




• Materials (particularly military and scientific journals) often represent an idealized rather than a real picture of a capability that is aspired to rather than possessed. However, such materials can provide a window into the future, if this caution is kept in mind.


• • Censorship or other motivations limit promulgation of military related information.
  
• • Deception is possible.


• • Translations may be needed, which often causes a delay in using the information.


• • Significant information may be overlooked in the high volume of material to be processed.

The next entry will be on HUMINT.