44. Intelligence Sources – 2. HUMINT

In blog entry Number 19 I posted a brief explanation of how intelligence works and the general categories of intelligence sources. I want to significantly expand that now, to present the complexity of gathering intelligence data in the modern world.

Sources are classified into about eight categories. Finished intelligence (for dissemination) is a fitting together of pieces from overlapping sources. In the following entries I will present each of these sources. I will review the sources here.

1. Open Sources


2. HUMINT


3. Signal interception


4. Measurement and sensing




1. MASINT


2. UGS




5. Imagery


6. Scientific and Technical Intelligence


7. Other




1. Diplomatic reports


2. Liaison relationships


3. Interrogation

2. HUMINT

As one would expect, HUMINT stands for human sources – gathered from a person on the ground. It is difficult to acquire (as in present-day Iran), and hard to manage. Further it is extremely difficult to verify validity and reliability of a human source.
HUMINT includes overt, sensitive, and clandestine activities and the individuals who exploit, control, supervise, or support these sources. It includes a wide range of activities from direct reconnaissance and observation to the use of informants and spies. HUMINT may provide such information as insights into adversary plans and intentions for target development, adversary deliberations and decisions for developing our own objectives, research and development goals and strategies, blueprints for weaponeering, etc. Some intelligence requirements can best be satisfied by human source exploitation.

1. Overt activities are performed openly without concealment. While some aspects may be classified, the overall activity is generally easily detected, or the sources are exploited in an open but discrete manner. Some overt HUMINT activities are:
   
   
   
   1. Conventional programs for interrogating, émigrés, refugees, escapees, prisoners of war, and detainees.
   
   
   2. After-action debriefing of military operations, and legal travelers.
   
   
   3. Programs to exploit open publications.
   
   
   4. Diplomatic reports. Such reports give indications of a country’s intentions and plans
      
      
      
      • Some are in the open,
        
      • Friendly accredited diplomats
        
      • Military attachés and Liaison relationships. Attaches are posted by a country to their embassies abroad. They are “legal” spies, and can be helpful not only to their home country but to the country in which they are posted since they provide a direct way of revealing information they want others to know about. Usually they are declared to the host country. It is a myth that liaison operates against the host country. There is the so-called "third-party rule" – whereby the recipient of intelligence from an ally should not share it on with anyone without the originator's consent. MI5 (in the UK) and the US insisted that this is an immutable law of international security. What a U.S. attaché learns in Germany is not shared with any other country other than the US and possibly Germany.
      
      
      • Other diplomatic reports obtained by other methods.
      
      
      
      
   5. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
      
   6. Patrolling (military police, patrols, etc.)
      
   
   
2. Sensitive activities fall between overt and clandestine. Because their disclosure would be detrimental to the best interests of the United States, they require special protection from disclosure, as well as concealment of the sponsor’s identity.


3. Clandestine activities must be conducted so that both the existence of the operation itself and the identity of the sponsor are secret. They may include rendition.




1. Espionage by agents
   
2. Interrogators of POWs or captured agents use a variety of methods to get information. Most simply try to provoke conversations, and may not even use direct questioning. Steps up may include psychological pressure, bugging of cells, sleep deprivation, noise, sounds of torture, and false executions. NATO makes much of the illegal “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques.


3. Strategic reconnaissance, as by Special Forces

Advantages of HUMINT

1. Can be used to reveal enemy plans and intentions and uncover scientific or weapon developments before they are used or detected by other technical collection systems


2. Can provide documentary evidence of enemy activities


3. Relatively cost effective


4. May provide coverage in areas beyond the capabilities of other sources, such as detailed descriptions of underground facilities or those located below jungle canopy, as well as internal facility arrangements


5. Can reveal construction characteristics for vulnerability estimates


6. Can determine production capabilities and impact of facilities on enemy military and industrial needs


7. Yields information on the sources of raw materials, equipment, and necessary transportation for systems analysis


8. May reveal direct and indirect relationships between facilities


9. Can give near real- time target intelligence via radio transmission


10. Can cover targets against which sensor programs are restricted by political restraints


11. Targeter can use it to refine or revise intelligence estimates based on other sources of information; helps the analyst learn identification and functions previously unidentified, as well as give direct and indirect effects of airstrikes during hostilities

Limitations of HUMINT

1. Time lag between collection, reporting, and verifying some information can be too long and render it useless


2. Collection success cannot be predicted with certainty


3. May be politically sensitive


4. Dissemination and fusion of information into targeting channels is often inadequate and difficult to accomplish


5. Determining reliability of the source and verifying the information is often very difficult

The next entry will be on SIGINT