03. Targeting Nuclear Weapons for Iran.

What would be targets Iran would select for its nuclear arsenal?

Targeting requires consideration of the capabilities of the weapons. Capabilities are: yield, accuracy, and time from alert to launch.
Yield of the weapon can vary over a wide range. Bigger is not necessarily better as destructive power does not increase at the same rate as the yield. Accuracy depends on the delivery vehicle. Time from alert to launch depends on the fuel used, and the time for personnel to ready and operate the launch. These are overlapping capabilities.

If Iran wishes to attack “hard” targets (protected weapons of the enemy, such as hardened silos containing ICBMs) then it must have rather accurate targeting. If the warhead is detonated at a range beyond its destructive capability, the target survives. For inaccurate weapons the only hope for use against hard targets is a very large yield. It is not likely that Iran would or could develop very high-yield weapons, owing to the technological difficulty in construction and the very difficult problem of finding a vehicle capable of delivering the weapon. Missile technology must develop over time, and constructing a missile with that is highly accurate is extremely difficult. The SCUD missile used by Saddam Hussein was notoriously inaccurate and never hit any target at which it was truly aimed. Iran has not demonstrated any flights of long-range missiles of accuracy. Based on the above, Iran would not likely target hard targets.

Soft targets, on the other hand, are vulnerable to low-yield weapons (in the order of kilotons, instead of megatons) and could be vulnerable to an Iran-developed weapon. Cities, ports, military installations are all soft. But what would be the strategic benefit of wiping out an Israeli city? Surely this would more than invite massive retaliation against Iran.

Still, we must keep in mind that Iran is not at all likely to act in what western minds would consider a “logical” manner. Given the nature of the regime, who can say what it might do. Intelligence will be weak regarding what rogue actions Iran might take.

Most likely, Iran will continue a nuclear program, proclaimed to be non-military, and not weapons oriented. At some point it will let “slip” hints that it is nuclearly armed. That may be all it needs to do to gain its geopolitical aims, or at least more of them, since it can never be discounted that it could develop tactical or even strategic weapons. The defense must always overestimate the offense. Who would want to ignore the threat of a nuclear attack if it might be credible?

My next blog will look at methods of preparing weapons grade fuel for nuclear weapons.